


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SP - 4/74
16 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

1. At the request of the NIO a meeting to discuss the proposed national intelligence programs for the next six months was held on 11 January 1974 (Room 7-E-32) attended by the following:



2. Howard Stoertz summarized the responsibilities of the NIO, the characteristics and problems in national intelligence on strategic programs, and the concepts and procedures for producing national intelligence during the next six months. His discussion followed closely the material in the attachment, Tab I, which calls for a program of shared responsibility among line producing organizations of the intelligence community having primary responsibility for subject matter. Mr. Stoertz proposed to make national intelligence a larger percentage of the community output, and to reserve judgment on the large annual set-piece estimates--e.g. NIE 11-3, 11-8--until alternatives have been examined. Comments on Mr. Stoertz' proposals are summarized:

a. Mr. Carver -- We have not yet arrived at firm conclusions about how to change the production program. Things of the past are not necessarily wrong, but we should take advantage of this point of departure to look critically at what we are doing. He pointed out that needs may have changed while the process of production continues pace.

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-2-

SP - 4/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

b. General Smith -- He shared Mr. Carver's view and enthusiastically supported the need to reexamine what we are doing.

c. Mr. Weiss -- In general he agreed with the proposals made, but he stressed that national intelligence should be oriented toward upcoming issues. Also he agreed that intelligence agencies should initiate recommendations for production which flow from our analysis of intelligence and which are related to planning and policy issues. Mr. Weiss believed that the annual estimates, without so much detail would still be needed as an overview, a backdrop, from which work would be conducted. He pointed out the extensive and prompt utility of the annual NIEs within the Department of State.

d. Mr. Carver -- He related the strong desires of the DCI that other intelligence agencies assume much more of the responsibility for national intelligence; national intelligence is not the parochial preserve of CIA. The DCI wants to create more of a sense of community in national intelligence.

e. Mr. Stoertz -- He noted that the implication of Mr. Weiss' comments about responding to more immediate issues was that we must anticipate those issues sufficiently in advance to conduct the necessary research. As for Mr. Weiss' comments about the annual NIEs, we did not propose that we solve all our problems by producing a series of short papers. However, there is no reason why we cannot make reference in short papers to more detailed material contained in documents other than NIEs.

f. Mr. Weiss -- We must anticipate needs more quickly. He pointed to NSSM-169 (covering nuclear strategy) as an example of decisions being made without the required intelligence support. He said a different targeting concept was being put forth but he asked "where is the intelligence basis?" He pointed out that some of the recent output of OSR on this topic appears to be inconsistent with NSSM-169.

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-3-

SP - 4/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

g. Mr. Brandwein -- He agreed that the national intelligence program needs more flexibility and with the characterization of the large, long lead-time estimates as "annual agony." By the same token, he said, we have learned from the NSSM production and SALT planning process that community-agreed papers oriented to key issues can be prepared promptly. As an approach, he believed the NIOs could borrow heavily from the NSSM/SALT system.

h. Mr. Knoche -- He agreed with the goal of having more intelligence community-type products other than NIEs.

i. Mr. Carver -- We should think of "estimates" with a small "e." The art form should be adjusted to the circumstances. For example, we should get rid of the word "coordinate" as it applies to national intelligence, since it seems to call for lowest common denominator estimates. We spend more time than necessary trying to square language to meet all interests. The user is better served by expressing differences of view in vigorous expressions.

j. Mr. Weiss -- He agreed with Mr. Carver, pointing out Secretary Kissinger's instructions that all positions will be surfaced. Mr. Weiss said that NSSM-169 is an example of differing views, but they were not surfaced in the preliminary stages of the paper. We must be sure we know the issues in time to express differences.

k. Mr. Knoche -- He agreed with Mr. Weiss that intelligence must be brought into the loop early.

l. Mr. Weber -- He pointed out the problem of timing of NIE issuance as related to major policy papers. He noted that the NIEs were not in phase with the NSSMs.

m. Mr. Carver -- If it were a perfect world, Part I of the NSSMs would be a national intelligence paper.

n. -- Commenting in general on the proposal of Mr. Stoertz was heartened by it and by the comments of Mr. Carver and Mr. Weiss. He pointed out that Admiral de Poix believed the large NIEs had become reference books, their judgments came too late and many judgments were buried. He thought an annual summary estimate instead of the large set-pieces would be the way to go.

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-4-

SP - 4/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

o. Mr. Stoertz -- We must provide more than annual summaries to meet the quantitative needs of consumers. (All agreed.)

p. General Smith -- As an example of this quantitative requirement he pointed out that the JSTPS (Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff) uses the NIEs as a basis for targeting which calls for considerable detail. He agreed however, that the details could be in documents other than NIEs.

q. Mr. Weiss -- He recommended that we not structure the work program for national intelligence too formally. We should orient ourselves to the more immediate issues first, but without neglecting the need for broader background papers. The work OSR is now doing in connection with NSSM-169 could have been done earlier and separate from the NSSM itself.

r. Mr. Knoche -- He pointed out the difficulties in finding people capable of preparing papers which conform to NIE standards. He recommended that we should accept variations in style.

3. The proposed national intelligence production program, February-July 1974 (Tab 3), was explained by Colonel DeBruler. Mr. Stoertz described the DCI program for using the "Key Intelligence Questions" (Tab 2) in the management process. Two of the KIQA on strategic programs, on which production has been scheduled, have been selected as part of a test of the KIQA system: (1) Soviet intentions and actions with respect to adherence to the ABM Treaty and SAL Interim Agreement. (2) The intended size role and armament of the Backfire force.

4. Discussions ensued on each of the issuances proposed for production. It was noted that they included periodic and aperiodic papers and that agencies with primary responsibility for production included, CIA, DIA and GMAIC. The work program as well as the comments and recommendations of the agency representatives were consistent with the concepts and proposals for national intelligence production discussed earlier by Mr. Stoertz.

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-5-

SP - 4/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

5. Mr. Stoertz concluded the meeting by requesting action by each of the attendees as contained in Tab 4 concerning the proposed production programs. Mr. Stoertz noted that representation at the meeting included three elements of CIA and DIA and that the NIO was quite willing to have more than one point of contact in each agency. He noted also that we were interested in research and production relevant to the work program underway not only by each agency but also by the components of the agency and by contractors.

6. The participants agreed to meet on 18 January 1974, to comment in more detail on the proposed work program as requested in Tab 4.



Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

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Attachment:
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11 January 1974

CONTENTS

- TAB 1 Production of National Intelligence on Foreign
 Strategic Programs: A Proposal
- TAB 2 Key Intelligence Questions For FY 1974
- TAB 3 Proposed National Intelligence Production
 February - July 1974
- TAB 4 Actions Requested

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11 January 1974

PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

--A PROPOSAL--

I. Responsibilities

25X1A a. On 1 November 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence abolished the Office of National Estimates and transferred the responsibilities of that office to the National Intelligence Officers established under CIA, 26 October 1973.

b. National Intelligence Officers will report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence, and will be the Director's personal representative on their area of responsibility. Tasking by NIOs on elements of the Intelligence Community will be subject to DCI approval and will pass through normal command channels of USIB member agencies.

c. The primary function of the NIO is to provide contact laterally across the functionally organized Intelligence Community and with customers and outside consultants. The NIO will provide Intelligence Community coordinated products, using such panels of experts or ad hoc committees and arranging USIB consideration as needed to meet national requirements. He will assist the Director of Central Intelligence in determining customer needs for National Intelligence, evaluating

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products and program effectiveness, and in identifying uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might be of assistance. The NIO will submit for review by the DCI fully objective presentations of alternative views and interpretations.

d. The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the National Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO) has administrative and coordinating authority over the NIOs and will establish and monitor production standards, work schedules, quality control and product review.

2. Characteristics and Problems in National Intelligence on Strategic Programs

a. Each NIO in carrying out his responsibilities will be affected by the special characteristics and problems associated with the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence on his particular geographic area or subject. Intelligence on foreign strategic programs is characterized by a multiplicity of consumers, massive production machinery, and long lead times for analysis and production of intelligence.

b. A multiplicity of consumers--

(1) In the field of strategic programs, the principal consumers of national intelligence are not confined to the President and the NSC as a whole. Most of the time, the principal requester of national intelligence is a single NSC member (e.g. the Secretary of

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Defense), or an NSC subgroup (e.g., WSAG), or a major component of the Department of Defense (e.g. DDR&E) or another agency (e.g. the JCS, NASA, ACDA).

(2) While the interests of a requester may be quite general or narrowly specific, national intelligence on strategic programs is almost always of legitimate interest to a wide circle of consumers. These consumers are concerned with both our general conclusions about foreign strategic programs and with the details underlying them.

(3) Sometimes this is because the consumers want intelligence to elaborate the reasons for its conclusions, or because they want us to be quite specific about uncertainties and differences of opinion. Often it is because the nature of the subject is such that policy implications cannot effectively be drawn unless working staffs (e.g., the NSC staff, the VPWG, the staff of DDR&E) are supplied with quantitative intelligence data and projections in considerable detail.

c. Massive intelligence production machinery--

(1) The analytical and estimative resources of the community responsible for finished intelligence production on foreign strategic programs comprise large research establishments--most notably OWI and OSR in CIA and the Estimates, Production and Technology

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directorates in DIA, but also including smaller research staffs in INR, the service intelligence agencies, and elsewhere.

(2) These establishments are supported by other large analytical resources within the community which bear responsibility for processing specialized types of intelligence, such as NSA and NPIC. They are supported as well by specialized organizations with less direct ties to the community, or with ties to one or another individual agency--examples are FTD, certain Navy research organizations, and CIA and DIA contractors.

(3) In the search for community-wide approaches to technical problems in the field of strategic programs, there have also been established over the years interagency committees with specialized responsibilities--GMAIC, SIC, JAEIC (all of which perform in some respects as specialized analytical working groups) and the SALT Monitoring Working Group.

(4) This structure, necessary to solve the complex and varied problems associated with the production of intelligence on foreign strategic programs, can fairly be described as unwieldy.

d. Long production lead times--

(1) An annual NIE on Soviet or Chinese strategic offensive forces often takes 6 months or more from T/R's to USIB approval.

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Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000800070043-8

-5-

Estimates on other subjects in the field--for example, on the nuclear capabilities of third countries--usually can be produced more rapidly, but still involve relatively long lead times.

(2) More important, those in the business appreciate that if the necessary contractual and in-house analytical work isn't well under way--and properly focused as to content and schedule--at the time the estimate is laid on, it is very often too late to get it completed and reviewed with sufficient care to incorporate its results into the estimate.

(3) Thus it is necessary to schedule estimates on foreign strategic programs well in advance and to operate a research and production program which is relatively inflexible.

e. Those criticisms of NIE's on foreign strategic programs which go to their nature, scope and method--rather than their substantive findings, which are not the subject of this paper--tend to reflect the particular position and concerns of the person making the comments.

(1) A senior official concerned with US foreign policy says it would be desirable to produce shorter estimates on a more flexible schedule, addressing current policy issues and containing conclusions with policy bite.

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(2) A DoD systems analysis group wants agreed quantitative estimates and projections in full detail, with alternatives and excursions, covering at least the next 10 years.

(3) A senior official in the intelligence community asks whether a way can be found to eliminate the annual agony of producing and coordinating the giant set-piece estimates on Soviet strategic forces.

(4) A senior NSC staff member, on the other hand, warns that a piecemeal approach to specific problems should not supplant a periodic, comprehensive approach to the entire force mix.

f. The big estimates on foreign strategic programs were in fact designed to meet a consumer-perceived need for a comprehensive, systems approach to strategic forces, utilizing the massive and fairly inflexible intelligence production machinery.

(1) They try to be all things for all men--from the short conclusions for generalists to the year-by-year projections for systems analysts. Further, defense planning has required that the alternative or representative force projections in the NIEs be supplemented by DIA projections of the most likely future forces.

(2) The big NIEs touch all bases, including such things as political, economic, and bureaucratic influences, and thus avoid a

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narrow technical basis for estimating, but in their comprehensiveness they can bury our conclusions about key questions in a welter of detail about everything.

(3) They insure that the producing machinery has plenty of lead time in which to focus on the task, but the very expectation of them tends to postpone until the big estimate the handling of problems for which the policymaker may have shorter suspense dates.

(4) In some respects we write them for ourselves, so that we will have a basis for flexible responses to short-fuse requests later in the year, but their quantitative details begin to get out of date almost as soon as they are issued and do not in fact provide a basis for subsequent responses.

g. The deficiencies, then, would seem to be cumbersomeness and lack of flexibility which often results in a failure to address major policy issues at the point when the policymaker most needs help, a failure to identify the key issues in advance and to focus our analysis and production on them, and a failure to keep our views on quantitative details up-to-date on a community basis.

3. Proposed Production Program, January - June 1974

a. A reasonable goal for 1974, in accordance with the DCI's general objectives and taking into consideration the special characteristics of

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national intelligence on strategic programs, is to develop a program of national intelligence production which will share the responsibilities among agencies, increase the number of national intelligence issuances, insure that key intelligence questions will be addressed and highlighted, and introduce a greater degree of flexibility into the system.

b. In accordance with this goal, it is proposed that:

(1) National intelligence should become a larger portion of the community's total output of finished intelligence.

(2) National intelligence should not be limited to NIE's alone--it can also include other forms of interagency production.

(3) The initiators of national intelligence production should include, not only requesters outside the community, but also the DCI and other intelligence officials.

(4) The responsibility for drafting national intelligence, and for coordinating it at levels below that of USIB, should not rest solely with CIA--it should be shared among elements of the community.

c. Implicit in the DCI's current program to identify "Key Intelligence Questions" (KIQ's) is the attempt to anticipate for each year the major issues that are likely to confront the policymaker and to which the production of national intelligence for that year should be geared. With

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the abolition of the Office of National Estimates, national intelligence addressing these issues must now be produced by the same components which produce other forms of finished intelligence--namely, by the line analytical components having responsibility for the subject matter.

d. It is proposed to develop a program for producing national intelligence during the first half of 1974, involving the line intelligence production organizations responsible for the subject matter; the NIO with the assistance of interagency advisory bodies and ad hoc groups; USIB subcommittees; and when required, the USIB principals. The proposed procedures call for the NIO to determine requirements and task intelligence-producing organizations through the command channels of USIB member agencies and for the end product to be reviewed and approved by designated bodies or the USIB.

e. This program need not result in a greatly increased production effort by line organizations. Rather, it can mean that certain intelligence estimates, projections and studies by line organizations on key issues should be elevated to the status of interagency products and identified as national intelligence.

f. It would be imprudent to suggest abandoning the major annual estimates on foreign strategic programs, however unwieldy they may be, in the absence of alternatives which are thoroughly conceived and tested.

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In a field so directly related to our national security, too much is at stake. Therefore, it is proposed that the present program cover only the first six months of 1974, which leaves the question open as to production of the large annual estimates during the last half of 1974. It is hoped, however, that by anticipating major intelligence issues related to policy and by addressing these issues in the course of the year, the community can improve its service to policymakers and evolve an alternative to the production problems associated with massive annual compendia.

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8 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL NIO's

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions

1. Attached is the final version of the Key Intelligence Questions -- final, that is, unless further changes are made or approved by the DCI during our session at 1400 today. In going through this package you will note that twelve KIQ's are preceded by a check mark. Our current thinking is that these twelve would be utilized on the first go-round as a pilot project or shakedown cruise to iron the bugs out of the system (how is that for metaphors lumped into one sentence). In other words, the initial run between now and 30 June would not be a full-blown effort but instead would be a preliminary trial to give us some experience in handling the mechanics involved.

2. My thinking is that the Key Intelligence Questions would be assigned among you for preliminary responsibility as follows:

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1.d. -
2.c. -
3.b. -
5.a. -
11.b.
12.c.
15.d.
16.b.
17.b.
21
23.a.
23.d. - Economic NIO

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George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

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